The Economist avisa que "llega el dolor" a la economía española

http://blogs.periodistadigital.com/d...st-espana-4747

PD).-La crisis de la economía española continúa dando que hablar en el prensa internacional. A los funestos pronósticos de WSJ y FT se suma ahora The Economist avisando que "ha llegado el dolor para nuestra economía". Advierte que Zapatero no ha hecho las reformas económicas necesarias y que eso le pasará factura. Esté preparado porque se vienen tiempos duros y ZP puede dejarnos apenas con lo puesto.

The Economist enumera implacable los síntomas negativos de la economía española: una inflación disparada al 4%, el consumo por el piso y el desempleo por las nubes. "Claramente", observa el semanario, "el comportamiento aparentemente robusto de la economía española era más frágil de lo que parecía".

Zapatero es débil por varios factores, según el semanario, y uno de ellos ha sido el poder que ha otorgado a los "regionalistas". Zapatero ha agravado con su "ingenua" negociación con ETA y sus pactos con independentistas.

"La única forma de pasar" por la fase de "dolor" que se avecina para la economía española es administrar la "indigesta medicina" de las reformas que ningún candidato, ni Zapatero ni Rajoy, ha propuesto "ni de lejos" en la pasada campaña electoral.

Al semanario no se le escapa a la alta dependencia de la economía española de sectores como la construcción y los servicios es una amenaza para el futuro. Al igual que FT coincide en que La dependencia del boom de la construcción y el fuerte endeudamiento del sector privado hacen a España muy vulnerable y alerta sobre los 400.000 inmigrantes que se quedarán sin trabajo.

Para The Economist, a Zapatero le falta inspiración y carisma mientras que Rajoy no le va en zaga y tampoco cuenta con la aprobación del semanario. Al final concluye que, con la que se avecina, estas elecciones hubiera sido mejor no ganarlas.


ORIGINAL:

http://www.economist.com/world/europ...ry_id=10808653

Spanish elections

The coming pain in Spain
Mar 6th 2008 | MADRID
From The Economist print edition

The next Spanish government faces a much tougher time than the outgoing one

AFP
ANYBODY who is confident of the outcome of Spain's election on March 9th should recall March 14th 2004. Three days after Islamist terrorists bombed four Madrid trains, killing 191 people, voters unexpectedly handed victory to the Socialists' José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. This weekend Mr Zapatero faces the electorate once again. Sober flags showing Mr Zapatero and his People's Party (PP) rival, Mariano Rajoy, flutter decorously along the two sides of Madrid's Castellana avenue, belying the bitter tensions between the two parties that have persisted since 2004. Opinion polls suggest Mr Zapatero will win—but the margin may be narrow.

On the face of it, that seems odd. The past four years have been good for Spain. Growth has averaged almost 4%. Spain has been producing most of the jobs created in the euro area. In December Europe's number-crunchers said it had overtaken Italy in GDP per head. Mr Zapatero's decision to pull Spanish troops out of Iraq was popular, as were most of his government's social policies, such as legalising gay marriages. Spanish governments tend to be re-elected at least once, and the country is naturally left-of-centre. Yet Mr Zapatero does not appear to be reaping the rewards.

His PP and Socialist predecessors as prime minister, respectively José María Aznar and Felipe González, both won absolute majorities in their second terms. Even Mr Zapatero's closest backers consider that unlikely this time. Much will depend on turnout—anything above 70% will boost him. Yet, as one ally concedes, if he fails to win an absolute majority, that will be a mark of Mr Zapatero's failure as leader. One problem is his lack of inspiration and punchiness. But the colourless Mr Rajoy is little better. The consensus is that Mr Zapatero held his own in the first televised debates between the two men, and won the second.

Mr Zapatero's struggle to win re-election seems to be attributable to three broader factors. The first and biggest is, surprisingly, the economy, now a matter of deep concern for many Spaniards. GDP growth is slowing sharply, from 3.8% in 2007 to 3% (officially) or even as little as 2% (say pessimists) this year. Unemployment jumped in both January and February. Consumer confidence is at a 13-year low. And inflation has ticked up above 4%.

Plainly, the economy's apparently robust performance was more fragile than it seemed. It has depended heavily on construction, which accounts for as much as 18% of GDP, nearly twice the share in other European countries. In recent years Spain has built more new houses than Britain, France and Germany put together. Now the property bubble has burst. In November new house-building requests fell by a quarter over a year earlier, says the Bank of Spain. House prices are dropping. No wonder voters feel glum.

The second factor weakening Mr Zapatero is his policy on the Spanish regions. It was risky to devolve more powers to the Catalans, and even more so to talk to the Basque separatists, ETA. Mr Aznar's refusal to discuss more regional autonomy had stoked separatist sentiment. Yet the new statute for Catalonia, fiercely resisted by the PP and now subject to a court challenge, has proved unpopular in the rest of Spain. It has not even helped the Socialists much in Catalonia—indeed, the regional parties will do well, putting them in a strong bargaining position with a new government (see article).

As for ETA, its decision to end a two-year ceasefire and resume its campaign of violence was a blow to Mr Zapatero, making him seem credulous and naive. It is true that the PP government also talked to ETA, and that thanks to good police work the terrorists are even weaker than they were. But Mr Zapatero's new regionalism has certainly not helped him.

The third issue that may have hurt him is immigration. Spain has become Europe's migration magnet: in the past decade it has taken in as many as 5m foreigners, second only to the United States. Most come from north Africa and Latin America. The population, once expected to fall, is growing fast: official forecasts show it rising from 45m now to almost 50m by 2015. Mr Rajoy has made much of uncontrolled immigration, with the avowed goal of luring native working-class voters away from the Socialists.

Mr Zapatero stoutly defends immigration, especially his decision to legalise many of those who entered Spain illegally. Yet the country is now changing so fast as to test social tolerance. In 2000 the foreign-born share of the population was just 4%. Seven years on, it is 12%, as high as anywhere in Europe. With the economy in trouble and unemployment rising, a backlash against immigration seems likely.

Immigration is intimately linked to Spain's economic performance. Many foreigners arrived to work in construction. They are also responsible for much demand for new housing outside the costas. And immigrants have been crucial in bringing about wage moderation—real wages have recently been falling—and in holding down inflation. One economist, tongue only just in cheek, calls immigration a de facto labour-market reform.

Immigration has also made two failings in the Spanish economy potentially worse. First, it has prolonged the property boom to the point where its bursting seems bound to cause more pain. The Bank of Spain insists that Spanish banks are healthier than their rivals, not least because it wisely kept them out of the fancy structured-finance products that have caused such trouble elsewhere. But it concedes that lending linked to property has risen from 40% of all loans in 2005 to 60% now. It puts total exposure to property at a whopping €300 billion ($450 billion).

The government insists it is well placed to respond to a slowing economy. The budget surplus is running at 2% of GDP; ten years ago the deficit was close to 3.4%. Mr Zapatero and Mr Rajoy are vying to make ever more extravagant promises of tax cuts and spending plans. But the Bank of Spain urges caution: inflation is high and the current-account deficit is a shocking 9% of GDP, so fiscal expansion may be riskier than it appears at first sight.

This should focus the attention on the second failing: Spain's lack of structural reforms to improve competitiveness, free up the labour market, liberalise the economy and start the slog of raising productivity by such measures as improving education. The good times of the past decade, plus European Union money that is now running out, allowed governments of both parties to put off taking unpalatable medicine. Spain faces its severest test since joining the euro a decade ago. The only way to pass is to make deeper reforms than either party has so far suggested. In some ways, this may turn out to be an election that it is better to lose than to win

The rain in Spain stays mainly in the plain!

REcientemente un importante periódico económico internacional comentó que el PIB de España había crecido en el 2007 por debajo del 2%. La lógica? muy sencilla: no hay ningún caso contrastado de un país que crezca por encima del 3% en un año y que genere paro en el compunto final del mismo con respecto al año anterior. Por otra parte, cuando las ventas de coches nuevos caen un 2% o más, la economía o está en una recesión o a punto de entrar en ella (http://www.albertonoguera.com/2006/1...n-en-2007.html) . Qué ocurre en España cuando bajan más de un 10%??
Se está manipulando todo.Hace ya unos meses un compañero de facultad que trabaja en una cadena de hoteles estuvo una buena temporada en Liubliana donde se supone que la inflación está sobre el 6,5-7% anual. Me comentaba que sí, que ciertos productos como la harina, el pan y tal que habían subido en torno según él decía al 10-15%, pero nada comparable con lo que está pasando en España. Qué ocurre en España entonces?? recuerdo que Solbes en el 95 decía que el déficit público era del 3-4% (se puede comprobar) y después resultó estar más bien al 8%. No me creo nada. En fin, que es lo que hay.

Pus si, hombre si...; unos vecinos pepitazos, me dicen hoy muy preocupados, porque no pueden salir en Semana Santita, porque le sale la casita rural por 200 € diarios.

Siejque, lo queremos todo!; joder!, los tardofranquistas, no salíamos a ningún sitio; con tele de dos canales en blanco y negro y hasta los cines cerrados y sin comer carne, porque era pecado.


País de contrastes.


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SEVILLA: OCUPACION HOTELERA ESTIMADA, DEL 70%


http://www.diariodesevilla.es/articl.../se/situa.html